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On May 31, 2001, USDA announced a change in the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) 
purchases prices for butter and nonfat dry milk under the dairy price support program.  The new 
price for butter (U.S. Grade A or higher, 25-kg blocks, salted) is $0.8548, an increase of 19.99 
cents per pound.  The new prices for nonfat dry milk are $0.90 for nonfortified and $0.91 for 
Vitamin A and D fortified, both types in 25-kg bags.  The new nonfat dry milk prices are 10.32 
cents per pound lower. 
 
This change in relative prices for butter and nonfat dry milk was controversial, even though it did 
not alter the support price for milk.  The change was supported by the International Dairy Foods 
Association and most dairy producer groups in the Upper Midwest.  The decision to change 
relative prices was strongly opposed by the National Milk Producers Federation and other dairy 
producer groups.   
 
 
What is meant by a butter-powder tilt? 
 
In implementing the dairy price support program, USDA sets purchase prices for butter, nonfat dry 
milk, and cheddar cheese at levels that allow manufacturers of these products to pay the announced 
support price for milk to dairy farmers, currently $9.90 for milk at a fat test of 3.7 percent.  The 
purchase prices for products are derived though formulas that use assumed yields of product per 
hundredweight of milk and specified manufacturing or “make” allowances representing 
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1 Professors and Dairy Marketing Specialists, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison/Extension.  manufacturing costs.  Yields and make allowances are consistent with those used to 
calculate component and Class III and Class IV prices under federal milk marketing 
orders. 
 
In deriving product prices for butter and nonfat dry milk, the two products are assumed to 
be jointly produced.
2  Thus, the sum of the value of butter and powder that can be 
produced from 100 pounds of milk less the make allowance for a butter powder plant 
must equal the support price for milk.  This means that the butter and nonfat dry milk 
prices can be altered as long as the combined value of butter and nonfat dry milk per 
hundredweight of raw milk stays the same.   
 
A relative change in product prices is popularly known as a butter-powder tilt – if one 
price goes down, then the other must go up to compensate for the lower value.  Think of 
the tilt as a teeter-totter.  The ends go up and down, but the fulcrum remains level. 
 
Butter-powder tilts were common in the early 1990s, after the 1990 farm bill instructed 
the Secretary of Agriculture to minimize the public cost of the dairy price support 
program by adjusting purchase prices.  At that time, butter was in surplus relative to 
nonfat dry milk.  Four tilts were made between April 1990 and July 1993, when the milk 
support price was $10.10 per hundredweight.  The butter purchase price was decreased 
from $1.0925 to $.65 and the nonfat dry milk price was increased from $.79 to $1.034. 
The industry responded by allocating milk fat from butter production to higher uses in 
other dairy and food products. The industry produces less butter today than 10 years ago. 
The result has been more volatile but generally much higher butter prices.  
 
Butter-powder tilts were re-authorized by the Agricultural Market Transition Act of 1996.  
As under the 1990 Act, the Secretary of Agriculture was required to tilt butter-powder 
prices as often as twice a year as necessary to minimize purchase and storage costs.  
However, no tilts were made under the 1996 Act until May 31, 2001, and that was the 
first tilt that increased the butter purchase price and decreased the purchase price for 
nonfat dry milk. 
 
Reasons cited for the May 31 tilt were: 
 
 
 An accumulation of nonfat dry milk stocks in quantities well above 
USDA’s ability to use the product 
 The level of expenditures to USDA 
 Significant market distortions 
 
 
                                                 
2 This is not a valid assumption.  Most of the butter manufactured in the U.S. is produced independent of 
nonfat dry milk, coming from excess cream skimmed in fluid milk processing and lower-fat cheese 
manufacturing.  However, the assumption correctly implies that the relative price relationship between 
butter and nonfat dry milk must conform to relative yields from raw milk. 
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668 million pounds (see Figure 1), about three times year-earlier levels.  Since the 
beginning of FY2002 (October 1, 2000) through the end of May 2001, the CCC 
purchased about 330 million pounds of nonfat dry milk.  This represents more than 40 
percent of the volume produced over that period of time.  Government purchase costs 
exceeded $340 million.  The CCC has purchased no butter in FY2002, since butter prices 
have been well above the $.655/pound CCC purchase price.  Thus, the market distortions 
cited by USDA in their decision relate to the price for one of the two joint products 
(butter) driven by market forces while the price for the other (nonfat dry milk) was 



































Why was the recent tilt controversial? 
 
Lowering butter prices and raising nonfat dry milk prices was not a controversial issue in 
the earlier tilts.  That’s because farm milk prices were only remotely tied to the price of 
nonfat dry milk and butter prices only affected the butterfat differential. 
 
Prior to May 1995, the key milk price indicator in the U.S. was the Minnesota-Wisconsin 
Price Series (M-W Price).  The M-W Price, dating to 1960, was an estimate made by 
USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) and its predecessor, the 
Statistical Reporting Service, of the average price paid for Grade B milk in Minnesota 
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factories, which used most of the Grade B milk produced in the two states. 
 
The M-W price adjusted to 3.5 percent butterfat was used in federal milk marketing 
orders as the Class III price, which at that time applied to milk used for making cheese, 
butter, and nonfat dry milk.  The M-W price was also used as the “mover” of Class II and 
Class I prices.  Minimum Class prices and farm-level blend prices were adjusted for 
varying fat tests using a butterfat differential. The butterfat differential was an adjustment 
in price per hundredweight for each one-tenth of one percent (point) deviation in butterfat 
test above or below 3.5 percent. The formula for the butterfat differential was (.138 X 
Chicago Grade A butter price) minus (.0028 X current M-W at test).  The formula 
represented the difference between the value of a tenth of a pound of butterfat and a tenth 
of a pound of skim milk in a hundredweight of milk.  The butterfat differential typically 
was in the 6 to 12 cents per point range.  
 
A declining volume of Grade B milk production prompted USDA to replace the M-W 
price with the Basic Formula Price (BFP) in 1995.  The BFP still relied on a monthly 
survey of Grade B plants in Minnesota and Wisconsin to establish a base price.  The base 
price was then adjusted for weighted average changes in cheese and nonfat dry milk 
prices.  The weights were the relative proportion of Minnesota and Wisconsin Grade B 
milk used for cheese and nonfat dry milk.  Hence, the BFP more explicitly incorporated 
nonfat dry milk prices than the M-W Price, but the nonfat dry milk weight was less than 5 
percent.  So cheese prices continued to dominate the federal order price mover.  There 
was no change in the calculation of the butterfat differential with adoption of the BFP 
except that the current M-W at test was replaced with the current BFP at test. 
 
In 1993 USDA issued a controversial final decision to adopt a special Class and price 
(Class III-A) for milk used to produce nonfat dry milk in plants regulated by federal 
marketing orders. This action came after more than two years of contentious 
administrative and legal proceedings. Class III-A pricing was advocated and supported by 
regulated milk handlers who operate butter/powder plants, which had been less profitable 
than cheese plants. These handlers argued that they were providing a valuable market-
wide service to all producers by balancing fluid milk requirements and producer milk 
supplies, processing “surplus” milk into butter and nonfat dry milk as required by bottling 
schedules. But, given the prices of butter and nonfat dry milk relative to cheese, the 
handlers maintained that they could not afford to pay as much for milk as cheese plants.  
 
Opponents of Class III-A pricing argued that it would inhibit the allocation of milk to its 
highest use, instead encouraging the expansion of nonfat dry milk processing capacity 
when market signals indicate that more milk should move to cheese plants. In fact, that is 
exactly what happened. The combination of less risky operating margins to plants with 
Class III-A pricing and an upward adjustment in the support price for nonfat dry milk 
with the butter/powder tilts in the early 1990s did encourage nonfat dry milk production 
in excess of market needs.    
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at least in markets with significant nonfat dry milk production, it did not affect other 
Class prices, which continued to be tied to the cheese-dominated Class III price. 
 
However, the dominance of cheese as the driver of federal order prices was 
fundamentally altered on January 1, 2000, when USDA adopted new pricing rules as part 
of a package of reforms mandated by the 1996 Farm Bill.  The new orders included a new 
milk class, Class IV, which is the minimum price for milk used to manufacture butter and 
nonfat dry milk.  In effect, this institutionalized the previous Class III-A price. 
 
More important, the new orders use a “higher of” formula for setting Class I prices.  
Class I prices for a given month are announced on the Friday prior to the 23
rd of the 
previous month.  They are derived from advanced skim milk values for Class III and 
Class IV, calculated on the Friday of the month preceding the 23
rd.  The advanced Class 
III skim milk value is based on cheese and whey prices from the two full calendar weeks 
preceding the 23
rd.
3 The advanced Class IV skim milk value is based on nonfat dry milk 
prices for the same two weeks. 
 
Whichever skim milk value is higher becomes the base skim milk price for Class I.  The 
market-specific Class I skim milk price is the base skim milk price plus the applicable 
Class I differential.   The Class I whole milk price is the market-specific Class I skim 
milk price times .965 (the proportion of whole milk consisting of skim milk) plus 3.5 
times the advanced Class I butterfat price (the advanced Class III/IV butterfat price plus 
the Class I differential divided by 100).
4  
 
The Class II skim milk price is also advance priced, and is equal to the advance Class IV 
skim milk price plus $.70 per hundredweight.   
 
With this change, nonfat dry milk potentially gained a key role in setting the price of milk 
for fluid purposes.  And to the surprise of most industry observers, the advanced Class IV 
skim milk value has exceeded the advanced Class III skim milk value in every month that 
the new orders have been in effect (see Figure 2). 
 
 
                                                 
3 For more information on how class and component prices are calculated, see Tom Cox and Bob Cropp, 
Federal Order Reform: The Final Rule, Marketing and Policy Briefing Paper No. 68, April 1999, and Ed 
Jesse and Bob Cropp, Order Reform and Reforming Order Reform, Marketing and Policy Briefing Paper 
No. 71, December 2000. 
 
4 USDA altered the new orders on January 1, 2001, by adding a separate Class III butterfat price, changing 
the calculation of the protein price, and making the “higher of” the higher of the Class III or Class IV prices 
expressed at 3.5 percent butterfat instead of skim values.  This change was suspended by a court injunction 
before it went into effect.  Since Class III and IV butterfat values are the same, the higher of skim values 
continues to be the mover pending resolution of the injunction. 
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With advanced Class IV milk prices consistently driving the Class I price, the importance 
of the price of nonfat dry milk and the Dairy Price Support Program purchase price was 
amplified.  The CCC price was setting the market price for nonfat dry milk.  And in 
doing so, the CCC was also setting the price for fluid milk.  Any reduction in the CCC 
price would therefore correspondingly reduce not only the Class IV price, but also the 
Class I and Class II prices.  This would result in lower farm level prices, with the amount 
of price reduction proportional to utilization of milk in the affected classes. 
 
So not surprisingly, there was considerable opposition to the tilt.  National Milk 
Producers Federation (NMPF) predicted dire consequences for dairy farm families with 
monetary losses approaching $1 billion. NMPF argued that the growing surplus of nonfat 
dry milk was not due to a relatively high support price for nonfat dry milk.  Rather, 
growing stocks were the result of domestic use of nonfat dry milk being displaced by 
imports of milk protein concentrates.  Major lobbying efforts were directed at Congress 
and USDA to maintain the status quo despite Congress’ earlier mandate requiring the tilt 
(the Agricultural Market Transition Act of 1996). 
 
The International Dairy Foods Association (IDFA) lobbied equally hard for the tilt.  Their 
position was that the high CCC price for nonfat dry milk was precluding export 
opportunities and encouraging imports of milk protein concentrates as well as 
discouraging the domestic use of nonfat dry milk.  IDFA also argued that fluid milk 
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product. 
 
Dairy interests in the Upper Midwest also supported the tilt, but for different reasons than 
IDFA.  About 80 percent of the milk pooled under the Upper Midwest order is used for 
making cheese.  Therefore, dairy farm incomes in that region were heavily influenced by 
the low cheese prices during 2000.  The “higher of” pricing rule partially insulated higher 
Class I use markets, since their price was tied to the fixed CCC purchase price for nonfat 
dry milk.  Compared to the previous M-W Price/BFP method of setting Class I prices in 
reference to cheese, effective Class I differentials were much higher.  In 2000, the 
advanced Class IV price averaged nearly $2.00 per hundredweight higher than the 
advanced Class III price.  So adjustments to a milk surplus were being disproportionately 
borne by producers in high Class III use markets.  
 
 
What will the tilt mean for dairy farmers? 
 
The May 31 tilt in butter-powder prices is, on net, positive for the dairy industry.  In our 
judgment, the “higher of” provision of order reform led to an unintended consequence – a 
complete separation of fluid milk prices from cheese prices.  The component pricing 
formulas used in the new orders work OK under “normal” circumstances.  But with very 
low cheese prices relative to the CCC purchase price for nonfat dry milk, the formulas 
result in price distortions.  There is an incentive to move milk to a product (nonfat dry 
milk) that is already in heavy surplus. Worse, the CCC price for the product in surplus 
becomes the sole driver of fluid milk prices.  The dairy price support program was 
certainly not intended to operate in that fashion.  Neither was it USDA’s intent that the 
“higher of” formula would consistently result in Class IV skim values moving Class I 
prices. 
 
The tilt will not prevent the possibility of this pricing distortion continuing.  But it will 
decrease the probability of Class IV skim milk values being consistently above Class III 
skim milk values.  Thus, it is more likely that fluid milk prices will be driven by cheese 
prices.  Tightening the relationship between cheese prices and Class I prices improves 
market signals to dairy producers.  Across all federal orders in 2000, Class IV utilization 
was about 7 percent, while Class III utilization was more than 45 percent.  It makes no 
economic sense to consistently price fluid milk in reference to Class IV.  
 
The tilt will make U.S. nonfat dry milk more competitive in world markets.  As of late 
May, world market prices for nonfat dry milk were in the $2,000-2,200 per metric ton 
(mt) range.  The new CCC nonfat dry milk price of $0.90 per pound translates to less 
than $2,000 per mt.  Of course, world market prices could adjust quickly to the new CCC 
price, but the incidence of FMD in European and South American countries could put 
U.S. nonfat dry milk at a premium. 
 
The tilt should also create economic incentives to use more nonfat dry milk domestically.  
In particularly, it will make milk protein in nonfat dry milk more price competitive with 
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was used as intermediate product in other dairy products. But domestic use of nonfat dry 
milk has declined, dropping 15 percent in 1999. 
 
The effect on farm milk prices, at least in the short run, will be minimal.  Recent strength 
in cheese markets has raised Class III milk prices despite higher butter prices (a ten-cent 
increase in the butter price reduces the Class III price by 4 cents).  Current futures prices 
suggest that the advanced Class III skim milk value will be higher than the advanced 
Class IV skim milk value for much of the remainder of 2001: 
 
 
CME Milk Futures, Settlement Prices, June 1, 2001 
 
     Contract 
Month   Class III  Class IV  III-IV 
 
JUN   01     14.90       14.81    +0.09 
JLY   01     15.47       14.80    +0.67 
AUG   01        15.46     14.95    +0.51 
SEP   01    15.45     14.90    +0.55 
OCT   01     14.40     14.65    -0.25 
NOV   01     13.81      13.90    -0.09 
DEC   01     12.92     13.82    -0.90 
JAN   02     12.05      13.12    -1.07 
 
Average  14.31   14.37   -0.06 
 
 
These prices are for milk testing 3.5 percent butterfat.  Since the butterfat price is the 
same for both Class III and Class IV, futures prices indicate that the Class III skim value 
will be higher than Class IV for June through September.  The relative futures prices 
suggest Class IV will be the Class I mover from September 2001 through January 2002.  
But these Class IV futures prices do not reflect the lower CCC purchase prices for nonfat 
dry milk, and will likely decrease. 
 
In the longer term, how dairy farmers’ pocketbooks are affected by the tilt depends on 
many factors.  The most important of these are the level of cheese prices relative to butter 
and nonfat dry milk prices and the utilization of milk by class.  If cheese prices remain 
strong, then Class III will likely move Class I on a regular basis.  In that case, any effect 
on farm prices would be limited to lower Class IV and Class II prices.  How much lower 
depends on how far market prices for nonfat dry milk fall toward the lower CCC 
purchase price bound.  Farm price effects would depend on market utilization of milk in 
these two classes.  For 2000, Class II utilization across all federal order markets was 10 
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5  In the Upper Midwest market, the 
respective percentages were 4 percent and 1 percent. 
 
If cheese prices weaken and Class IV moves Class I, then there will be an additional 
negative impact on farm prices from the tilt.  The magnitude of the impact would depend 
on how far nonfat dry milk prices fall and how much milk is used in Class I. 
 
Because of uncertainties with respect to where nonfat dry milk prices will settle and 
whether Class III or Class IV moves Class I, it is not possible to derive a very accurate 
projection of the likely farm level effect of the tilt.  However, in estimating price effects, 
we do not believe that it is realistic to assume that market prices for nonfat dry milk will 
be fixed at the new CCC price of $.90 per pound.  Neither do we feel it is reasonable to 
assume that Class IV will consistently move Class I.  That phenomenon has been the 
result of not making the tilt earlier. 
 
While there is a possibility that the tilt could result in marginally lower milk prices in 
markets with high Class I, Class II, and Class IV use, there are clear offsetting gains from 
the tilt.  Treasury costs will be lower.  Nonfat dry milk exports will likely be higher and 
milk protein concentrate imports will likely be lower.  Most important, economic costs, 
which are significant but cannot easily be measured, will be reduced.  These costs include 
flawed market signals to dairy farmers and to producers and users of nonfat dry milk.  
USDA made the correct decision in making the butter-powder tilt.   
 
                                                 
5 California, which is not included in these percentages, has a significantly higher utilization percentage for 
their equivalent of Class IV.  The Calfornia Class 4-a utilization in 2000 was 31 percent. 
M&P Briefing Paper No. 72    Page 9 of 9 